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Abstract
Consumption risk sharing among U.S. federal states increases in booms and
decreases in recessions. We nd that small rmsaccess to nancial markets
plays an important role in explaining this stylized fact: business cycle uc-
tuations in aggregate risk sharing are more pronounced in states in which
small rms account for a large share of output. In addition, better access of
small rms to credit markets in the wake of state-level banking deregulation
during the 1980s seems to have loosened the dependence of aggregate risk
sharing on the business cycle. Not only do our result support that better ac-
cess to credit markets may have made it easier for the owners of small rms
to smooth income in the face of adverse cash-ows shocks to their business.
They also suggest an additional welfare benet from banking deregulation:
access to nancial markets has become more reliable and is more easily
available when households and rms need it most urgently  in economic
downturns. A possible implication of these ndings is that the welfare costs
of a monetary tightening could have been substantially reduced as a result
of the nancial liberalization at the state level.
Keywords: Interstate risk sharing, regional business cycle, pro-
prietary income, state banking deregulation
JEL classication: E32, E44, F3
1 Introduction
Consumption risk sharing among U.S. federal states increases in booms and
decreases in recessions. We nd that small rmsaccess to nancial markets
plays an important role in explaining this stylized fact: business cycle uc-
tuations in aggregate risk sharing are more pronounced in states in which
small rms account for a large share of output. In addition, better access of
small rms to credit markets in the wake of state-level banking deregulation
during the 1980s seems to have loosened the dependence of aggregate risk
sharing on the business cycle.
Our analysis places itself between two important recent strands of the
literature: the rst, initiated by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), explores the
implications of state-level banking deregulation on growth, the comovement
of regional business cycles (Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004)) and more
recently, risk sharing (Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sørensen (2007), Acharya,
Imbs and Sturgess (2006)).
The second strand emphasizes that the degree to which certain household
groups and small rms have access to nancial markets is itself subject to
dramatic uctuations over the business cycle. Starting with nancial accel-
erator models in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), a huge literature 
both theoretical and empirical, neither of which we attempt to survey here
 has emphasized that tightening collateral constraints in credit markets
may act as a potentially powerful amplication mechanism for structural
shocks, most prominently to monetary policy. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
were among the rst to point at the role of small rms with their strong de-
pendence on bank nance for the monetary transmission mechanism. More
recently, Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2006) have shown that uctuations
in the availability of mortgage collateral induces business cycle variation in
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interregional risk sharing whereas Agronin (2003) is among the rst to point
at the business cycle uctuations in aggregate risk sharing.
We extend these analyses in several important respects. First, we allow
for a range of risk sharing channels which allows us to explore how the
entire pattern of risk sharing  income smoothing through capital income
ows, scal smoothing and most importantly intertemporal consumption
smoothing through household savings and dissavings varies over the business
cycle. This allows us to identify the sources of the procyclical variation
in risk sharing: whereas income smoothing (through capital income ows)
is strongly anticyclical (as argued by Agronin (2003)), overall, aggregate
consumption risk sharing is strongly procyclical because there are strong
procyclical uctuations in the extent to which a regions households can
smooth consumption through borrowing and lending.
The access of small businesses to nancial markets  in particular to
credit  seems key in explaining this dependence of risk sharing on the
phase of the business cycle. Risk sharing is more strongly procyclical in
federal states where small businesses are particularly important as employers
or where the income of small business owners (proprietary or proprietors
income) accounts for a large share of state personal income.
Secondly, we explore the connection to the rst strand of the literature
surveyed above by controlling for changes in the regulatory environment.
Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sørensen (2007) have shown that there is a
strong e¤ect of state level banking deregulation on the level of interstate
income risk sharing. Our analysis here suggests that the impact of state-
level banking deregulation on the variability of risk sharing over the cycle
is easily equally important: while we corroborate that state level banking
deregulation has improved interstate risk sharing through capital income
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ows, we show that it has also eliminated a large part of the variability of
consumption risk sharing over the business cycle. Again, small rms seems
to have played an important role in this: the procyclical pattern of risk
sharing is reduced most strongly for those states where small businesses are
particularly important.
From a welfare perspective it not only matters that bank deregulation
increases risk sharing on average, but also that it improves risk sharing
most when households and rms most urgently need it in recessions. The
results in this paper show that this latter e¤ect of banking deregulation
(on the variability of risk sharing) is easily of the same order of magnitude
as the e¤ect on its average level: Demyanyk et al. nd that risk sharing
increases by about 10-18 percentage points as a consequence of banking
deregulation. Our results here suggest that each additional percentage point
of GDP growth increases aggregate risk sharing by around 3-4 percentage
points. The average NBER recession during our sample period reduces
aggregate risk sharing by around 17-18 percentage points. The reduction in
the variability of risk sharing therefore appears as an important additional
source of the aggregate welfare gains from banking deregulation.
At a more general level, our ndings have implications for the literature
that emphasizes that the costs of aggregate business cycles critically depend
on the heterogeneity of households and rms. In particular, they are in line
with Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) who show that small rmsoutput reacts
particularly strongly to a tightening of monetary policy. Better access to
credit markets may have made it easier for the owners of such small rms
to smooth income in the face of adverse cash-ows shocks to their business.
But in addition, it has made their access to nance much more reliable by
decoupling the availability of credit from the state of the aggregate economy.
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This suggests that the welfare costs of monetary tightening could have been
substantially reduced as a result of the liberalization of state-level bank
branching regulation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section,
we introduce our empirical framework and use it to document the procyclical
nature of aggregate risk sharing. We then present our data and the details
of the empirical implementation in section three. In section four we discuss
our results. Section ve concludes.
2 Consumption risk sharing over the business cy-
cle
We measure consumption risk sharing through panel regressions of the form
 log
Ckt
Ct
= u

 log
GSP kt
GSP t

+ "kt (1)
where Ckt is per capita consumption in region k in period t, GSP
k
t is the
regions output (for U.S. federal states: gross state product) per head and the
asterisk denotes the national per capita average of the respective variable.
In such a regression, we can think of the estimate of u as the amount of
uninsured idiosyncratic output risk.
Regressions such as (1) by now have some tradition in the both the
microeconometric as well as in the macro literature. Mace (1991), Cochrane
(1991) and Townsend (1994) were the rst to suggest regressions similar to
(1) on household level data as a test of the null of complete markets. In a
world with complete markets, growth in marginal utility should be equated
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across regions, so that in all states of nature:
u0(Ckt+1(s))
u0(Ckt (s))
= (s) (2)
where s indexes the state of nature. A key implication of (2) is that if
risk is e¢ ciently allocated, marginal utility growth should be independent
of country-specic variables. To the extent that we can associate changes
in marginal utility with consumption growth, consumption growth should
therefore be independent of a regions business cycle risks - regressions of
the form (1) should yield a coe¢ cient of zero. More recently, Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996) have argued that the estimate of u may be
more generally informative: even if the null of complete nancial markets is
rejected, u still is a measure of market incompleteness. In panel regressions,
u is regularly between 0 and unity, so that 1 u can straightforwardly be
interpreted as the share of the average regions idiosyncratic risk that gets
laid o¤ in nancial markets, whereas u is the portion of non-diversied
idiosyncratic risk faced by the average region.
Estimates of u based on regional data typically fall into the range be-
tween 0:2   0:3, a quarter to a third of a regions idiosyncratic output risk
remains uninsured. Based on our data set here, we obtain an estimate of
0:29. Such estimates are typically based on panel regression such as (1) and
they do not allow for the possibility that the amount of risk sharing that a
group of regions achieves may actually be varying over the business cycle.
In this paper we argue that aggregate risk sharing varies over the busi-
ness cycle because certain groups of households may nd it harder to obtain
consumption insurance in nancial markets during recession than during
booms. In particular, many small rms heavily rely on access to bank loans,
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i.e. to credit markets, to smooth uctuations in business cash ow. It is well
documented that credit market frictions tend to hit small rms harder than
bigger rms that can issue their own bonds or may even be able to issue
equity in stock markets. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that the credit
channel of monetary policy has a much stronger impact on small rms than
on bigger rms. To the extent that most small rms are non-incorporated,
their ownersbusiness and personal nances are likely to be closely inter-
twined so that uctuations in business cash ow and in the availability of
credit over the business cycle may a¤ect the degree of consumption risk
sharing that proprietors of non-incorporated businesses can achieve. In this
way, credit market restrictions may translate into uctuations in aggregate
risk sharing across regions.
We present rst evidence to this e¤ect in gure 1: the gure plots a
sequence of cross-sectional estimates of the coe¢ cient u. To obtain this
sequence, we run the regression (1) as a cross-sectional regression for each
t, where t ranges from 1963 to 1998:
ckt  ct = u(t)
h
gspkt  gspt
i
+ "kt (3)
Here, and in the remainder of the paper, we use lower-case letters to
denote logarithms, so that ckt   ct =  log

Ckt =C

t

. The solid line in
gure (1) represents the sequence fu(t)g, the dashed line is real GDP-
growth. As is apparent, these two time series comove very closely but in
opposite directions; their correlation coe¢ cient is  0:48 the share of non-
diversied state-level idiosyncratic risk increases in recessions and decreases
in booms.
As we show in the remainder of the paper, this cyclical pattern in u(t)
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is more pronounced in states were small businesses are important. Fur-
thermore, we showt that this cyclical pattern almost vanishes after banking
deregulation.
2.1 Patterns of risk sharing
The coe¢ cient u in (3) tells us how much of the idiosyncratic risk faced by
the average federal state remains uninsured at time t. In order to obtain a
better understanding of the nature of the frictions that drive time variation
in u(t), we also want to know how this risk sharing is achieved. Building on
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) (ASY) we therefore explicitly consider
three channels of interstate risk sharing.
We refer to the rst channel as income smoothing: to what extent do
net interstate capital and labour income ows help insure income against
uctuations in output? To capture net interstate capital and labour income
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ows, we look at the wedge between output (gross state product, GSP) and
state level personal income (SPI). Note that this wedge may also in part
be accounted for by income of legal entities (such as incorporated rms) in
so far as this income is not disbursed to households. In this respect SPI
di¤ers from the income concept underlying gross national product (GNP)
that is used in aggregate, nationwide income accounting. Since GNP data
is not available at the state level, it is not possible to disentangle the risk
sharing through net interstate factor income ows from the intrastate income
smoothing achieved through the balance sheets of legal entities. Small rms
- that are our focus here - are often registered as limited liability companies
or in other quasi-incorporated forms (such as S-corporations), so that we
would expect that this channel of risk sharing could well matter in our
ndings.
The second channel we consider are net transfers through a progres-
sive tax system through the social security systems all of which may allow
residents of a federal state to further smooth disposable relative to state
personal income. For brevity, and in line with the extant literature, we call
this channel the scal channel.
Finally, there may be further consumption smoothing through credit
markets at the individual (personal) level, after (disposable) income for the
current period is known. This e¤ectively amounts to households smoothing
their consumption through savings and dissavings. We therefore refer to
this third channel as consumption smoothing.
To gauge the contribution of each of these channels to aggregate risk
sharing, we run the following panel regressions:
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gspkt  esikt = K + Igspkt + kI +  It + "kK;t (4)
esikt  fdsikt = F + Fgspkt + kF + Ft + "kF;t
fdsikt  eckt = C + Cgspkt + kC + Ct + "kC;t
eckt = U + Ugspkt + kU + Ut + "kU;t
Since all states face aggregate US-wide shocks that cannot be insured by
denition, we remove the US-wide aggregate by using the idiosyncratic or
state-specic components of all variables that we denote these with a tilde
so that eykt = ykt   yUSt (for eykt = gspkt , esikt , fdsikt , eckt ). The
coe¢ cients kX capture state-specic xed e¤ects. Finally, to control for any
remaining common time-variation in the intercept that may not already be
captured by formulating all regressions in terms of idiosyncratic variables,
we also include a set of the time-specic common e¤ects Xt .
Note that I + F + C = 1   U by construction, so that the above
regressions provide us with a complete decomposition of the cross-sectional
variance of state-specic output growth. In this way we obtain not only a
picture of how much risk is shared (1   U ), but we also get a breakdown
into the contribution of the di¤erent channels to aggregate risk sharing (the
coe¢ cients K , F and C):We call the vector  = [I ;F ;C ;U ] the
pattern of risk sharing.
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3 Empirical implementation
3.1 Data
We use a panel of variables for the 51 U.S. states for the period 1963-1998.
To measure regional risk sharing on each level we employ the updated data
set constructed by ASY. These data consist of annual gross state product
and personal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Disposable state income is constructed as state income plus federal transfers,
minus total federal taxes raised in the state. State consumption consists of
state/local government and private consumption. Since private consumption
at the state level is not available, state private consumption is estimated as
the state retail sales data re-scaled by the ratio of total private consumption
to total US retail sales. Real gross domestic product is the sum of gross state
products over all 51 states. All these variables are in per capita terms and
deated by the price index for personal consumption expenditure. Growth
rates of real per capita variables are calculated as rst di¤erences of natural
log of per capita deated level values. Further details on all data and their
preparation are provided in the appendix.
We consider two measures of the importance of small businesses in a
federal state. The rst is the share of (non-farm) proprietors income in
state personal income. This measure of proprietorsincome or proprietary
income is readily obtained from the National Income and Product Account
(NIPA)-tables and is available from the the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). The second measure is the share of small business employment in
total state employment. This measure denes establishments as small if
they have less than 100 employees. The data is available from the Geospatial
and Statistical Data Center at the University of Virginia library.
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While the rst measure focuses more narrowly on the role of those house-
holds that actually own small businesses, the second is a broader measure in
that it focuses on the role of small businesses for the local economy at large.
As we show, our results throughout are very similar for the two measures.
We measure the direct e¤ect of deregulation using a dummy variable
which becomes one from the year in which both interstate and intrastate
deregulation were completed. Deregulation dates are from Demyanyk et al.
(2007).
NBER recession and expansion dates are from NBER Business Cycle
Dates.
3.2 Empirical setup
To explore business cycle uctuation in the pattern of risk sharing as well as
its variation across federal states, we parametrize  as a function of aggre-
gate variables. In addition, we control for (potentially time-varying) regional
characteristics. Again, collecting k(t) = [kK(t);
k
F (t);
k
C(t);
k
U (t)], we
parametrize
kX(t) = X0 + z
k0
t X1 (5)
for X = K;F ;C;U . Here, X0 measures the average amount of risk insured
via income, scal, and consumption smoothing and uninsured risk respec-
tively when zkt equals zero. X1 exhibits the change in each level of risk
sharing associated with shifts in zkt . We partition z
k
t into aggregate and
regional characteristics zk0t =

x0t;y0kt

.
By plugging (5) into the panel sharing regressions (??) above and mul-
tiplying out, we then obtain a set of interaction terms with gspkt . The
coe¢ cients on these interaction terms then correspond to the respective
coe¢ cients in the vector X1 and allow us to calculate 
k
U (t) given the
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aggregate and state specic characteristics at time t.
Again, in all our regressions, we control for region-specic xed and
aggregate time e¤ects.
Note that the interaction term regressions that ensue from this specica-
tion for kX(t) we will not generally need to include the uninteracted terms
zkt . The reason for this is that the time-variation in aggregate variables will
be captured through the panel time-specic e¤ects. Equally, as long as the
regional characteristics are assumed to be time-invariant (which we will do
in the majority of cases e.g. the economic weight of small businesses does
generally not vary much over time), these will be fully captured by the re-
gional xed-e¤ects. Hence, the regressions we estimate will generally be of
the form
xt = X0gspkt + zk0t X1gspkt + X + kX + Xt + "kX;t
with xt = gspkt   esikt , esikt   fdsikt , fdsikt   eckt , eckt for X =
I; F; C; U respectively.
4 Results
Our rst set of results is presented in table 1. Here we run the decomposition
(4) above by parametrizing
X(t) = 0X + 1Xgdpt (6)
where gdpt is aggregate GDP growth. Conrming the intuition provided
in gure (1), we nd that consumption risk sharing increases in booms
and decreases in recessions (i.e. U (t) is countercyclical). Interestingly,
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the income and consumption smoothing channels have opposite cyclical de-
pendence on GDP; whereas income smoothing through capital markets de-
creases in booms and increases in recessions, the opposite is true for con-
sumption smoothing in credit markets. Consumption smoothing decreases
in recessions, whereas it improves in booms. This latter e¤ect dominates
the positive e¤ect of recessions on income smoothing (and is further rein-
forced through the scal channel) so that the total extent of risk sharing, as
measured by 1  U (t), is strongly procyclical.
These results are robust to the inclusion of alternative measures of the
business cycle. In panel B, we capture the business cycle using the of-
cial NBER recession and expansion dates. We also distinguish between
recessions and booms to check for the possibility of asymmetries in the de-
pendence of risk sharing on the cycle. There is no sign of such asymmetries:
the coe¢ cients on the expansion and recession indicators are virtually of the
same order of magnitude and all correctly signed throughout and with the
sole but only marginal exception of the expansion indicator in the regression
for U also highly signicant.
1
[TABLE 1 about here]
One of the main claims of our paper is that risk sharing uctuates over
the business cycle because small rms access to nancial markets varies
over time. Specically, small rms heavily rely on bank nance. Non-
incorporated rms, by denition, cannot raise capital in stock markets. In
addition, small businessesnance and the personal consumption decisions
1Though estimated U - coe¢ cients indicate that reduction of aggregate risk sharing in
recessions is stonger than rise in booms, we can not reject the hypothesis 1U + 2U = 0.
Hence, we suppose that there is no asymmetries between expansions and recessions and
do not explore this issue further
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of their owners tend to be closely intertwined. A tightening of credit market
conditions is therefore particularly likely to a¤ect the ability of small busi-
ness owners to smooth consumption over time. To the extent that credit
market access by small businesses is an important determinant of the varia-
tion of aggregate risk sharing over the business cycle, our expectation would
be that it is the uctuation in the contribution of the credit market channel
of risk sharing that is the main driver of this comovement. This is what we
nd here: our estimate of C(t) is strongly procyclical and highly signicant.
Interestingly, income risk sharing decreases in booms and rises in reces-
sions. This pattern has also been observed by Agronin (2003). The most
likely reason for this is that the share of small business ownersincome (pro-
prietary income) in U.S. output is generally strongly procyclical. Since, by
denition, proprietary income cannot be interregionally disbursed through
dividend payments, the share of capital income available for interstate in-
come smoothing decreases. We conrm this conjecture below.
However, our results here, lead to conclusions that are otherwise diamet-
rically exposed to Agronins since we also take account of the consumption
smoothing channel: the extent to which states use credit markets as a way
to obtain consumption smoothing is much more procyclical than the in-
come smoothing channel is anticyclical. Hence, uctuations in access to
consumption smoothing possibilities in credit markets is the main driver of
the variation in aggregate risk sharing over the business cycle.
We show next that the cyclical pattern of risk sharing that we estab-
lished in table 1 is indeed much more pronounced when proprietary income
accounts for a large portion of aggregate income in the economy. First, in
panel A of table 2, we split our sample of states into three equally.sized goups
according to wheter the importance of small businesses is high, middle or
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low.2 We then rerun the regression specication (x) for the unsmoothed
component , U (t), on each of these groups. As is apparent, the coe¢ cient
on the interaction term between aggregate GDP, gdp, and per capita gross
state level product growth, is highly signicantly negative for those states
where small businesses are important. For the other two groups of states,
aggregate risk sharing does not seem to covary strongly with the business
cycle. The results are qualitatively the same, irrespective of whether we use
the income or the employment based measure of small business importance.
[Table 2 about here]
Secondly, we estimate a specication for X(t) in which the sensitivity to
the aggregate business cycle is a direct function of small business importance.
To this end, we include an interaction term between gdpt and k, where k
stands for either the share of proprietary income in personal income (shapik)
or for small business employment (SBEk). Our speciciation for X(t) then
becomes:
X(t) = X0 + X1gdpt + X2gdpt
k
Panel B of table 2 presents the results both for the non-shared component
of idiosyncratic risk, U (t), as well as for the three risk sharing channels,
X = I; F; C. For both measures, our previous results are conrmed: the
cyclical dependence is more pronounced where small rms are important.
Turning to the patterns of risk sharing, we see that this feature can be
explained by the fact that the consumption smoothing channel is particularly
procyclical in states where small businesses are important.
2These groups are provided in table A1 in the appendix.
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Note also that the coe¢ cient U1;i.e. the one on gdp, now becomes
insignicant, suggesting that cross-sectional variation in the importance of
small businesses for the local economy seems to be able to completely ac-
count for the dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the state of the busi-
ness cycle.
All this suggest that small rms play an important role in explaining
why aggregate risk sharing uctuates over the business cycle. It is, however,
conceivable, that the time variation in these rmsaccess to nance is not
mainly the result of them being rather small, but rather the the outcome of
these rms being concentrated in particular sectors of the economy.
We address this issue in table 3, where we repeat our regressions for
U (t), but now we also include a number of controls. Specically, we capture
industrial structure through a sectoral specialization index of the form
SPECk =
SX
s=1
8<:GSP skGSPk   1K   1
KX
j=1;j 6=k
GSP sj
GSPj
9=;
2
where GSP sk=GSPk is the share of value added in sector s in the total
value added of state k. In our regressions, we use the estimates of SPECk
provided in table (1) of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) for both
the one and the two digit industry classication levels. In our specication
for u(t) we then also include both SPEC and its interaction with gdp.
In some of the regression reported in table 3, we also include a linear trend
to account for the possibility that the degree of aggregate risk sharing may
have changed over our sample period due to othe unobserved factors.
[Table 3 about here]
The results clearly show that industrial structure matters both for the
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degree of interregional risk sharing as well as for its cyclical dependence.
More specialized regions tend to be better insured, a stylized fact rst es-
tablished by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001, 2003). It is also
appears to be the case that more specialized regions tend to be exposed
more to cyclical variation in risk sharing, even though this result appears
less pronounced in the weighted least squares regressions. Controlling for
industrial structure does, however, not a¤ect our ndings that small busi-
nesses are paramount in explaining why aggregate risk sharing uctuates
over the cycle. We therefore conclude that it is not mainly industrial struc-
ture but the incidence of small rms that can account for the patterns we
have documented above.
4.1 The role of banking deregulation
Our maintained hypothesis is that small rmsaccess to credit markets, par-
ticularly to bank loans, is a key determinant of risk sharing. A nascent but
growing literature argues that regulatory changes in banking markets that
occurred in the United States during the 1980s may have had a profound
impact on small rms access to credit. Specically,during the 1980s, most
federal states gradually abolished regulation, previously enacted in the after-
math of the great depression, that restricted the formation of larger banks
by forbidding banks or their holding companies to operate outside their state
(sometimes even their county) of origin. Following the Douglas Amendment
to the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act, most federal states gradually abol-
ished these restrictions which led to a huge consolidation in the banking
sector and a better interstate pooling of credit risk. From the point of view
of economic theory, one would expect that better interstate pooling of such
risk could lead to substantial welfare gains. Indeed, Jayaratne and Strahan
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(1996) show that federal states that deregulated their banking markets ear-
lier did eventually grow faster. They ascribe much of this growth gain to
better access of small rmsto credit. In a recent important contribution,
Demyanyk et al. demonstrate that income risk sharing increased due to
state-level banking deregulation and they also show that this increase was
more pronounced in states where there are lots of small businesses. While
our paper is closely related to Demyanyk et al.s,our analysis di¤ers in scope
in that we focus on the role of proprietary businesses and state-level banking
deregulation for business cycle variability in risk sharing rather than on the
e¤ect of deregulation on the level of risk sharing.
In most states, deregulation proceeded in two waves: in most cases,
branching and ownership restrictions within the state were abolished rst
(intra-state deregulation) whereas the formation of larger banks or bank
holding companies across states as well as interstate mergers were allowed
only later (interstate deregulation). Our maintained hypothesis is that small
rmslocal access to nance is a precondition for them to benet from any
form of banking deregulation: if a small rm cannot borrow from out-of
county banks (e.g. due to an ine¤cient and fragmented banking system) it
will not be able to benet from what may be a better interstate pooling
of bank funds (which may be one of the bents of interstate deregulation).
This is also the gist of the results in Demyanik et al. who report that the
gains from deregulation  in as far as they concern small businesses are
mainly associated with intra-state liberalization. We discuss the importance
of the distinction between intra- and interstate deregulation in more detail
the next subsection but unless oterhwise mentioned, we focus on intra-state
deregulation.
To capture deregulation empirically, we use a set of dummies SDDkt that
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are unity after that point in time at which a state k has abolished intra-state
bank branching and ownership restrictions.
In table 4, we explore if intra-state banking deregulation has had an
impact on the the pattern of risk sharing and the degree to which it varies
over the business cycle. In panel A, we rst introduce the dummy SDDkt to
allow for a state-specic impact on the level of risk sharing. Doing so leaves
our conclusions with respect to the cyclical uctuation in the pattern of risk
sharing una¤ected; the point estimates for all channels as well as for the
unsmoothed component remain virtually unchanged and highly signicant.
[Table 4 about here]
Quite in line with Demyanyk et al., we nd a sizeable positive level e¤ect
of banking deregulation on the level of income smoothing through capital
markets: deregulation leads to roundabout 20% more risk sharing through
the capital market. Interestingly, however, we also nd that deregulation
lowers the amount of consumption smoothing by roughly the same, so that
the net e¤ect of banking deregulation on u appears insignicant. This
would seem to suggest that banking deregulation has had a pronounced
e¤ect on the patterns of income and consumption smoothing but less so on
the total amount of risk shared.3
Our argument here is that banking deregulation could have had an eco-
nomically at least equally important e¤ect by weakening the variability of
3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the reasons for this shift in the pattern
of risk sharing. One possible explanation could be provided by the creation of the S-
corporation in the early 1980s. The S-corporation, though being a legal entity, is tax
exempt. Only prots disbursed to shareholders are taxed as personal income (statistically
they are then registered as proprietary income). In a progressive tax system, this could
create a tax incentive to smooth the disbursement of prots, provided the rm can bu¤er
uctuations in cash ow through access to credit markets. Clearly, we would expect the
latter to have becom easier in the wake of deregulation.
19
aggregate risk sharing, mainly by making small rmsaccess to credit less
dependent on the state of the business cycle.
Table 4, panel B shows the impact of banking deregulation on the cyclical
pattern of risk sharing:
kX(t) = X0 + X1gdpt + X2gdptSDD
k
t (7)
For both the income and the consumption smoothing, the coe¢ cients
1 and 2 have opposite sign and are highly signicant. In both cases, we
accept the hypothesis 1 + 2 = 0 at very high signicance levels. This
carries over to u(t) as well. Here again, we cannot reject U1 + U2 = 0.
These ndings suggest that banking deregulation has eliminated almost all
of the business-cycle dependence of aggregate risk sharing.
Small businesses are, again, key in this nding. In table 5, we interact
gdp with the share of proprietary income and one minus the state-level
deregulation dummy, i.e. we parametrize
X(t) = X0 + X1gdpt + X2gdpt
k(1  SDDkt ) + X3SDDkt (8)
Quite in line with our ndings in table 2, we nd that risk sharing is much
more strongly dependent on the business cycle in those states and in those
times when proprietary income is high. Again, this is true, irrespective of
whether we use small business employment (k = SBEk) or the share of
proprietary income (k = shapik). The interaction with 1  SDDkt ensures
that the e¤ect on risk sharing variability is switched o¤after state reg-
ulation. Now, the coe¢ cient on the stand-alone gdp-term, 1 , appears
insignicant in all channels and also for U . This suggests that the business-
cycle dependence of risk sharing is not only explained well by the interaction
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between the share of small businesses and aggregate GDP; it seems in line
with the data that the dependence on aggregate GDP has been substantially
diminished as a consequence of banking deregulation.
4.2 Intra- vs. interstate banking deregulation
So far the measure of deregulation we used in our analysis was the date
of intra-state deregulation of banking services in a given state. Here, we
examine to what extent intra- or interstate deregulation has shifted the
patterns of risk sharing and, in particular, to what extent one of the two
forms of deregulation has changed the variability of risk sharing over the
cycle.
Table 6 displays results for each deregulation measure separately and for
both measures together including both level and business-cycle e¤ects on
risk sharing. It is apparent that whilst interstate deregulation has mainly
a¤ected the average level of income and consumption smoothing, only in-
trastate deregulation has had a signicant impact on the variability of risk
sharing. Again, this is true for all individual channels as it is for aggregate
risk sharing, 1   U (t). We think that this result has a highly intuitive
interpretation: We should expect that, on average, improvements in inter-
state risk sharing are mainly brought about by a better pooling of credit risk
across states. Allowing the formation of banks that operate across state bor-
ders was a key feature of interstate deregulation. Intrastate deregulation, on
the other hand, has permitted bank branching and the opening of new banks
within states. This is likely to have facilitated access of certain household
groups and in particular of small rms to credit markets within the state,
thus reducing the variability of credit market access over the business cycle.
But we should not expect intrastate regulation to hugely help improve risk
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sharing with other states on average.4Our results in this respect clearly tie
in with the ndings of Jayaratne and Strahan and Demyanik et al. who
also ascribe the importance of deregulation for small businesses rather to
the intra-state than the inter-state dimension.
4.3 Extensions and robustness
4.3.1 Heteroskedasticity
We also examine whether our results are similar when we use weighted LS,
rather than OLS, estimation - OLS estimation, being unweighted, is likely
to give larger weight to smaller states. Column I in table 8 shows that our
main result, that aggregate risk sharing positively depends on business cycle,
still holds.
4.3.2 Risk sharing, asset prices and collateral constraints
As nal exercise we examine to what extent our results are a¤ected by
allowing aggregate risk sharing to vary with asset prices. There are two
channels through which asset prices could account for risk sharing uctua-
tions. First, asset prices uctuations a¤ect the value of collateral and may
therefore have an impact on credit market access. Secondly, asset price uc-
tuations, in particular of stock prices, could a¤ect risk sharing over the cycle
because they directly change the degree of interregional portfolio diversi-
cation: Household holdings of domestic stocks represent a claim to output
in other federal states so that stock ownership brings interregional diversi-
cation.5 When stock prices rise, the value of this diversied component
4 If it improves risk sharing, then the extent of this improvement is rather very small
or insignicant.
5This is certainly true if a household holds a diversed claim on an entire tsock portfolio.
But it is also likely to be the case if the houeshold holds only a limited number of stock
of companies. Provided these companies are su¢ ciently big, their stock represent claims
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of wealth increases relative to that of non-diversiable components, such as
labour income, housing or proprietary wealth. Therefore, interregional risk
sharing is likely to uctuate with stock market valuations.
To assess to what extent our results interact with time variation in col-
lateral values, we turn to the recent study by Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh
(2006) who have argued that the availability of housing collateral constrains
interstate risk sharing in the U.S. Possibly, the availability of housing collat-
eral could help explain why risk sharing uctuates over the business cycle.
In addition, given that small businesses face high non-insurable risk and
may therefore face particularly severe credit constraints, the availability of
housing collateral may be especially important for small business owners for
whom personal and business nance are closely intertwined. To explore this
nexus, we parametrize
 = 0 + 1gdp+ 2myt  k + 3myt + 5(t  t) (9)
where myt is Lustig and van Nieuwerburghs indicator of housing collateral
scarcity.6 Table 7 reveals that business cycle dependence of risk sharing at
each level of smoothing remains highly signicant. At the same time, how-
ever, scarce housing collateral entails a drop in income smoothing. Hence,
housing collateral scarcity clearly matters for risk sharing, but it cannot ex-
plain the dependence of interstate risk sharing on aggregate GDP growth.
Interestingly, the e¤ect of collateral scarcity on risk sharing is amplied
in states with a high share of proprietary income. Note also that once we
consider the interaction of proprietorship with housing collateral scarcity,
to their prots from many di¤erent federal states.
6Housing collateral scarcity is rescaled housing collateral ratio, that is measured as
deviation from the cointegration relationship of households real estate wealth and labor
income plus transfers. Further details of estimation are in data appendix.
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the aggregate housing collateral factor alone ceases to have a signicant
impact on aggregate risk sharing: if a state exhibited a zero share of propri-
etary income out of personal income, aggregate risk sharing would appear
to be independent of housing collateral. These results, again, suggest that
small rmsaccess to credit seems to be crucial in understanding why risk
sharing uctuates over the business cycle. But the fact that the cyclical
dependence of risk sharing holds up even once we control for Lustig and
van Niewerburghs collateral scarcity measure, also suggests that housing
collateral constraints may only be a part of our story.
Table 8 explores the impact of asset prices in particular of stock market
valuations on interregional diversication. To this end, we include a mea-
sure of asset price cycles as an additional interaction term in our regressions.
We use Lettaus and Ludvigsons (2001) cay -residual, an econometric proxy
of the consumption-wealth ratio that, as Lettau and Ludvigson have shown,
is a very good indicator of the cyclical component in U.S. stock markets. As
is apparent from columns II-IV of table 8, cay indeed contains useful addi-
tional information, that helps explain uctuations in aggregate risk sharing:
risk sharing signicantly increases when asset prices are high (cay is low)
and decreases, when asset prices are low (cay is high). But note that the
inclusion of cay does not change our results with respect to the variation of
risk sharing as a function of aggregate GDP.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we establish that interstate risk sharing in the United States
varies over the business cycle, with risk sharing increasing in booms and
decreasing during downturns. This variation in aggregate risk sharing is
quantitatively important. Over our sample period, the average state would
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share 79 percent of its business cycle risk. But every percentage point in-
crease in GDP growth increases risk sharing by almost four percentage points
and in the trough of the average recession in our sample period, risk sharing
was 17% percentage points below this level.
There is also a distinct pattern in how risk is shared over the business
cycle. Interestingly, we nd that income smoothing through capital income
ows is hugely countercyclical, whereas consumption smoothing through
savings and dissavings at the household level is strongly procyclical. It is the
latter e¤ect that dominates, so that aggregate risk sharing is also strongly
procyclical.
We argue that these patterns of risk sharing are determined by time-
variation in the ability of small rms to obtain credit. First, we demonstrate
that the business cycle dependence of risk sharing is much more pronounced
in states where small rms are particularly prevalent, either because pro-
prietary income constitutes a higher fraction of personal income or because
small business employment is high. Secondly, we show that the deregula-
tion of state-level bank branching and holding legislation in the U.S. has
hugely a¤ected this pattern: banking deregulation virtually removes the
dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the business cycle and, again, this
reduction in cyclical dependence is strongest in states where small businesses
are important.
At a theoretical level, banking deregulation may a¤ect risk sharing in two
ways: better interstate pooling of credit risk may lead to more risk sharing
on average. Secondly, in models with collateral and borrowing constraints,
consumption risk sharing may be sensitive to the phase of the business cy-
cle. While we corroborate and extend recent ndings by Demyanyk et al.
(2007) concerning the rst e¤ect by showing that banking deregulation has
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altered the long-term, average pattern of risk sharing by increasing income
risk sharing at the household level, we nd the second e¤ect quantitatively
at least equally important: banking deregulation has increased risk shar-
ing particularly in business cycle downturns, thus improving credit market
access for small rms most when it is also most needed.
Interestingly, we nd that the rst of the two e¤ects  the long-term
level e¤ect on risk sharing to be associated with interstate deregulation,
whereas the reduction in the cyclical dependence of risk sharing is linked
mainly to intrastate deregulation.
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6 Data appendix
Gross State Product (gsp). Gross State Product is dened as the "value
added" of the industries of a state. Data for gross state product are available
from the BEA. GSP (as all our data) is divided by state-by-state population.
State Income (si). State income is dened as the sum of earnings
(wages and proprietorsincome), distributed prots (including interest and
rent) of residents of the state and state and federal non-personal taxes (in-
cluding corporate taxes and indirect business taxes). State income is con-
structed by ASY of the single components that are available from the BEA.
Disposable State Income (dsi). Disposable income is dened as
state income plus federal transfers to individuals and federal grants to state
governments minus federal non-personal taxes and contributions and federal
personal taxes. Federal grants are provided by the United States Statistical
Abstract, federal personal taxes and transfers are available by state from
the BEA.
State Consumption (c). State consumption is dened as the sum
of private consumption and consumption by the state government. Private
consumption at the state level is not available. ASY constructed private
consumption as retail sales re-scaled by the ratio of aggregate US private
consumption to aggregate US retail sales.
Share of Proprietary Income (shapi). We calculate the share of
proprietary income as the ratio of state proprietary income to state per-
sonal income. The both data for personal and proprietary income are from
the BEA. Proprietary income is dened by the BEA as current-production
income of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and tax-exempt cooperatives.
It excludes dividends, monetary interest received by nonnancial business,
and rental income received by persons not primarily engaged in the real
estate business. A sole proprietorship is an unincorporated business owned
by a person; a partnership is an unincorporated business association of two
or more partners; a tax-exempt cooperative is a non-prot business organi-
zation that is collectively owned by its customer-members7.
Small Business Employment (SBE). Small businesses are estab-
lishments with a number of employees less than 100. We measure small
business employment as number of people employed in small business estab-
lishments relative to total employment. Since available data are from 1977
to 1997, we use idiosyncratic time-series averages for every state k, so that
SBEk = mean(SBEkt   SBEt), where SBEt is cross-sectional mean for
7The national estimates of the income of non-farm proprietorships are based on tab-
ulations of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax returns. According to tax law IRS does
not distinguish between general partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability
companies and, hence, owners of partnerships and LLCs report their business income or
losses on their individual tax returns. That is why proprietary income does include income
from LLCs .
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every time period t. The data is available from Geospatial and Statistical
Data Center, University of Virginia library.
Gross Domestic Product (gdp). Gross domestic product is con-
structed as sum of gross states products (not per capita) over all states for
every time period t divided by total US population.
NBER Indicators. The data are from NBER Business Cycle Dates
(http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). NBERPeak dummy equals one, when
business cycle reaches peak, otherwise it is zero. NBERTrough dummy
equals one, when business cycle reaches its trough, otherwise it is zero.
NBERExpansion becomes one from trough to peak, including peak, from
peak to trough it is zero.
Deregulation (SDD). We use data on banking deregulation from De-
myanyk et al. (2007), Table 1. Deregulation dummy becomes one from the
year where both interstate and intrastate deregulation took place. We mea-
sure the e¤ect of intrastate branching deregulation using dummy variable
Dintrak;t , which switch on (from 0 to 1) the year state k permitted statewide
branching by merges and acquisitions and stays on thereafter. The interstate
deregulation indicator Dinterk;t switches on the year state k permits entry by
out-of-state banks and stays on thereafter.
Housing Collateral Ratio (my). We follow Lustig and van Nieuwer-
burgh (2005, 2006) and estimate housing collateral ratio myt as the devia-
tion from the cointegrating relationship myt = log(ht) + b$ log(yt) + bt+ b,
where ht is housing wealth measured by real estate wealth, yt is labor in-
come plus transfers, t is time trend, and b is a constant. Then we remove
a constant and a trend, so that the resulting time series myt are mean zero
and stationary, according to an ADF test. The housing collateral ratio is
rescaled so that it lies between 0 and 1 and measures collateral scarcity:
myst =
mymax myt
mymax mymin , where my
max and mymin are the maximum and mini-
mum observation in the respective samples.
Consumption-Wealth Ratio (cayt). The data are freely available at
Martin Lettaus home page (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~mlettau/).
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Table 1: Risk Sharing and the Business Cycle.
Table reports results from the panel OLS regressionsgspk;t   finck;t = I + Igspk;t +  It+Ik + Ik;t,finck;t   gdinck;t = F + Fgspk;t + Ft +Fk + Fk;t,gdinck;t   eck;t = C + Cgspk;t + Ct +Ck + Ck;t,eck;t = U + Ugspk;t + Ut +Uk + Uk;t.gspk;t , finck;t , gdinck;t , and eck;t are dened in the text.  are dened as follows.  stays
for I; F; C; U .  are not reported. The data is annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are
in parenthesis. Signicance at the 10% level is denoted by a *, and at the 5% level by **.
( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U )
Panel A: (t) = 0 + 1 gdpt + 2(t  t)
0 0.5819** 0.0308** 0.1708** 0.2164**
(48.8202 ) (3.0092 ) (5.6348 ) (7.6987 )
1 -3.1640** 1.0643** 6.2182** -4.1185**
(-8.1399 ) (3.1891 ) (6.2900 ) (-4.4926 )
2 0.0170** -0.0017 -0.0235** 0.0082**
(12.1962 ) (-1.4183 ) (-6.6138 ) (2.4773 )
Panel B: (t) = 0 + 1NBERpeakt + 2NBERtrought + 3(t  t)
0 0.5236** 0.0795** 0.2563** 0.1407**
(39.5847 ) (7.1518 ) (7.6962 ) (4.5686 )
1 -0.0147 -0.1106** 0.2160** -0.0907
(-0.5730 ) (-5.1164 ) (3.3353 ) (-1.5141 )
2 0.0779** -0.0324* -0.2244** 0.1789**
(2.9498 ) (-1.4609 ) (-3.3738 ) (2.9080 )
3 0.0178** -0.0030* -0.0237** 0.0089**
(12.3437 ) (-2.4886 ) (-6.5350 ) (2.6622 )
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Table 2: Risk Sharing and Small Businesses
Panel A reports the results of panel regressions according to (4) in the text.  is dened as
 = 0 + 1 gdpt + 2 gdpk.  stays for I; F; C; U . k denotes time-series means
of the share of proprietary income or small business employment for every state k and is de-
ned respectively as 1k =
1
T
1998P
t=1964
(Shapit;k) and 
2
k =
1
T
1998P
t=1973
(SBEt;k).
Panel B reports results from the panel OLS regression eck;t = U+Ugspk;t+ t+k+Uk;t.
U is dened as U= 0U+1Ugdpt. The states are splitted according to the measure
of small business importance ("low", "middle", "high") k. k is dened as before.  are
not reported.The data is annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Signi-
cance at the 10% level is denoted by a *, and at the 5% level by **.
(I ) (F ) (C ) (U )
Panel A
 = 0 + 1 gdpt + 2 gdp1k
0 0.5925** 0.0304** 0.1506** 0.2264**
(49.4285 ) (2.9600 ) (4.9911 ) (8.0562 )
1 6.8483** 0.6292 -12.2464** 4.7689**
(7.2659 ) (0.7788 ) (-5.1627 ) (2.1579 )
2 -87.1189** 3.8735 159.9360** -76.6907**
(-11.8772 ) (0.6160 ) (8.6638 ) (-4.4592 )
 = 0 + 1 gdpt + 2 gdp2k
0 0.5796** 0.0312** 0.1744** 0.2149**
(46.8685 ) (3.0477 ) (5.6916 ) (7.6360 )
1 6.7570** -2.2970 -11.2474 6.7874
(2.3284 ) (-0.9563 ) (-1.5644 ) (1.0278 )
2 -15.6308** 5.2279 27.4094** -17.0065
(-3.5158 ) (1.4208 ) (2.4885 ) (-1.6810 )
Panel B
low k middle k high k
k = 
1
k
0U 0.3519** 0.1918** 0.2090**
(5.1772 ) (5.7192 ) (3.5257 )
1U -3.5808 -1.0718 -7.4563**
(-1.6030 ) (-0.8588 ) (-4.4388 )
k = 
2
k
0U 0.3678** 0.2373** 0.1804**
(5.4217 ) (3.7876 ) (4.5150 )
1U -2.8655 -3.7095* -4.7409**
(-1.3566 ) (-1.7027 ) (-3.6419 )
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Table 3: Risk Sharing, Proprietary Income and Industrial Specialization
Table reports results from the panel WLS/OLS regressions eck;t = U+Ugspk;t+Uk;t. gspk;t is the growth rate of gross state product in state k
in period t andgspk;tis gspk;t minus US-wide value of gspUSt.ck;t and eck;t are dened similarly using state consumption. U is interpreted as
amount of uninsured risk and is dened as U = U0 + U1z, where z contains chosen aggregate variables. IS
1d;2d
k are 1- or 2-digit specializalion
indices, that are dened in the data appendix. 1k =
1
T
1998P
t=1964
(Shapit;k) and 
2
k =
1
T
1998P
t=1973
(SBEt;k). are not reported.The data are annual
from 1963 to 1998. T-statisticis are in parenthesis. Signicance at the10% level is denoted by a *, and at the 5% level by **
( I ) ( II ) ( III ) ( IV ) ( V ) ( VI ) ( VII ) ( VIII ) ( IX ) ( X ) ( XI ) ( XII )
0U 0.36** 0.34** 0.40** 0.28** 0.42** 0.42** 0.43** 0.42** 0.42** 0.46** 0.46** 0.46**
(8.46) (6.78) (11.17) (5.63) (10.50) (7.58) (11.51) (11.39) (7.51) (11.06) (10.97) (10.94)
gdpt 4.22* 4.89** 13.61** 1.10 14.94** -2.58 2.63** 18.27** 2.96 16.62** 1.52 16.28**
(1.95) (2.24) (2.06) (0.16) (2.29) (-0.83) (1.13) (2.67) (0.43) (2.70) (0.59) (2.62)
gdpt1t -82.75** -85.95** -62.01** -79.64** -79.81**
(-4.88) (-4.94) (-3.31) (-3.97) (-3.92)
gdpt2t -32.33** -9.17 -34.85** -43.04** -23.17** -42.86** -41.58**
(-2.85) (-0.87) (-3.10) (-3.49) (-2.15) (-4.03) (-3.85)
IS1dk -0.02** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03**
(-4.24) (-2.55) (-2.91) (-2.90)
IS2dk -0.01** -0.005 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**
(-2.83) (-1.64) (-2.86) (-3.98) (-3.94) (-3.74) (-3.71) (3.74)
gdptIS1dk 0.69
(1.68)
gdptIS2dk 0.38** 0.18 0.58** 0.45** 0.21 0.41**
(3.34) (0.49) (5.35) (2.84) (1.34) (2.60)
Trend no no no no no no no no no no yes yes
Method 0LS 0LS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS WLS OLS WLS WLS WLS
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Table 4: Risk Sharing, Banking Deregulation and the Business Cycle
Table reports results from the panel OLS regressionsgspk;t   finck;t = I + Igspk;t + IdSDDkt + Ik;t,finck;t   gdinck;t = F + Fgspk;t + Fd SDDkt + Fk;t,gdinck;t   eck;t = C + Cgspk;t + Cd SDDkt + Ck;t,eck;t = U + Ugspk;t + Ud SDDkt + Uk;t.
gspk;t is the growth rate of gross state product in state k in period t andgspk;tis gspk;t minus US-wide
value of gspUSt. inck;t and finck;t, dinck;t andgdinck;t, ck;t and eck;t are dened similarly using state income,
disposable state income and consumption respectively.  are interpreted as amount of income smoothing,
federal smoothing, consumption smoothing and the amount not smoothed and are dened as follows.  stays for
I; F; C; U . SDDkt is intrastate deregulation dummy, it becomes 1 from the year of the ks state intrastate de-
regulation. , d are not reported. The data is annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parenthesis.
Signicance at the 10% level is denoted by a *, and at the 5% level by **.
( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U )
Panel A:  = 0 + 1SDDkt + 2 gdpt
0 0.4607** 0.0756** 0.2600** 0.2037**
(25.3404 ) (4.9552 ) (5.6681 ) (4.8316 )
1 0.1952** -0.0727** -0.1403** 0.0177
(8.8712 ) (-3.9316 ) (-2.5261 ) (0.3463 )
2 -3.0152** 0.9573** 6.2243** -4.1664**
(-7.5839 ) (2.8673 ) (6.2057 ) (-4.5189 )
Panel B:  = 0 + 1 gdpt + 2 gdptSDDkt
0 0.5801** 0.0311** 0.1746** 0.2142**
(47.4552 ) (3.0275 ) (5.7245 ) (7.6073 )
1 -6.0512** 1.1847** 11.0141** -6.1475**
(-11.4427 ) (2.6698 ) (8.3460 ) (-5.0463 )
2 5.4644** -0.2079 -9.2033** 3.9467**
(7.7511 ) (-0.3514 ) (-5.2312 ) (2.4302 )
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Table 5: Risk Sharing, Banking Deregulation and Proprietary Income
Table reports results from the panel OLS regressionsgspk;t   finck;t = I + Igspk;t + IdSDDkt +  It+Ik + Ik;t,finck;t   gdinck;t = F + Fgspk;t + Fd SDDkt + Ft +Fk + Fk;t,gdinck;t   eck;t = C + Cgspk;t + Cd SDDkt + Ct +Ck + Ck;t,eck;t = U + Ugspk;t + Ud SDDkt + Ut +Uk + Uk;t.gspk;t , finck;t , gdinck;t , and eck;t are dened in the text.  are dened as  = 0 + 1gdpt
+2gdpt  k(1  SDDkt ) + 3SDDkt .  stays for I; F; C; U . k denotes time-series means
of the share of proprietary income or small business employment for every state k and is dened
respectively as 1k =
1
T
1998P
t=1964
(Shapit;k) and 
2
k =
1
T
1998P
t=1973
(SBEt;k). SDDk is intrastate
deregulation dummy, it becomes 1 from the year of the ks state intrastate deregulation.  are
not reported.The data is annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Signicance
at the 10% level is denoted by a *, and at the 5% level by **.
( I ) (F ) (C ) (U )
Panel A:  = 0 + 1gdpt + 2gdpt  1k(1  SDDkt ) + 3SDDkt
0 0.5103** 0.0846** 0.1383** 0.2668**
(26.0876 ) (5.0963 ) (2.8010 ) (5.8339 )
1 -0.9138* 1.3380** 1.0698 -1.4941
( -1.7878 ) (3.0834 ) ( 0.8291 ) (-1.2504 )
2 -34.5781** -6.2651 84.8153** -43.9721**
( -6.4335 ) (-1.3730 ) (6.2513 ) (-3.4996 )
3 0.1202** -0.0862** 0.0437 -0.0777
(4.8706) (-4.1149) (0.7011) (-1.3462)
Panel B:  = 0 + 1gdpt + 2gdpt  2k(1  SDDkt ) + 3SDDkt
0 0.4954** 0.0856** 0.1737** 0.2453**
(25.4534) (5.2090) (3.5359) (5.4080)
1 -1.2293** 1.4701** 1.7896 -2.0304
(-2.2652) (3.2076) (1.3068) (-1.6057)
2 -5.7200** -1.6425 14.2039** -6.8414**
(-4.8008) (-1.6324) (4.7245) (-2.4644)
3 0.1389** -0.0888** -0.0004 -0.0497
(5.5959) (-4.2378) (-0.0058) (-0.8594)
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Table 6: Risk Sharing, Intra- and Interstate Banking Deregulation
Table reports results from the panel OLS regressionsgspk;t   finck;t = I + Igspk;t + IdSDDkt +  It+Ik + Ik;t,finck;t   gdinck;t = F + Fgspk;t + Fd SDDkt + Ft +Fk + Fk;t,gdinck;t   eck;t = C + Cgspk;t + Cd SDDkt + Ct +Ck + Ck;t,eck;t = U + Ugspk;t + Ud SDDkt + Ut +Uk + Uk;t.gspk;t , finck;t , gdinck;t , and eck;t are dened in the text.  are dened as follows:  stays for I; F;
C; U . SDD1k;t and SDD
2
k;t denote intra- and interstate deregulation respectively. 
, d are not
reported. The data are annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Signicance at the 10%
level is denoted by a *, and at the 5% level by **
( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U ) ( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U )
SDDk;t= SDD
1
k;t, Intrastate Deregulation SDDk;t= SDD
2
k;t, Interstate Deregulation
= 0+1gdpt+2gdptSDDk;t+3SDDk;t
0 0.49** 0.09** 0.18** 0.25** 0.51** 0.03** 0.28** 0.19**
(25.18) (5.24) (3.62) (5.45) (36.58) (2.40) (7.86) (5.83)
1 -4.71** 0.37 10.97** -6.63** -3.55** 1.11** 6.63** -4.18**
(-8.24) (0.76) (7.62) (-4.99) (-8.55) (3.12) (6.30) (-4.29)
2 3.25** 1.14* -9.13** 4.74** 0.12 -0.27 1.01 -0.85
(4.10) (1.71) (-4.57) (2.57) (0.09) (-0.26) (0.32) (-0.29)
3 0.15** -0.09** -0.01 -0.05 0.26** 0.01 -0.37** 0.10
(5.92) (-4.27) (-0.08) (-0.91) (8.43) (0.45) (-4.77) (1.39)
= 0+1gdpt+2gdptD2k;t+3gdptD1k;t+4D2k;t+5D1k;t
( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U )
0 0.48** 0.08** 0.19** 0.24**
(25.23) (5.13) (3.85) (5.39)
1 -4.72** 0.36 10.97** -6.61**
(-8.38) (0.76) (7.67) (-4.98)
2 -1.57 -0.69 5.71* -3.46
(-1.20) (-0.61) (1.72) (-1.12)
3 3.05** 1.12 -9.37** 5.20**
(3.68) (1.58) (-4.46) (2.66)
4 0.22** 0.07** -0.43** 0.14*
(6.69) (2.36) (-5.11) (1.81)
5 0.06** -0.11** 0.15** -0.10
(2.25) (-4.94) (2.19) (-1.52)
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Table 7: Risk Sharing, Small businesses and Housing Collateral
Table reports results from the panel OLS regressionsgspk;t   finck;t = I + Igspk;t + Ik;t,finck;t   gdinck;t = F+Fgspk;t+Fk;t, gdinck;t eck;t= C+Cgspk;t + Ck;t,eck;t = U+Ugspk;t+Uk;t. gspk;t is the growth rate of gross state product in state k in
period t andgspk;tis gspk;t minus US-wide value of.gspUSt. inck;t and finck;t, dinck;t andgdinck;t, ck;t and eck;tare dened similarly using state income, disposable state income and con-
sumption respectively.  are interpreted as amount of income smoothing, federal smoothing,
consumption smoothing and the amount not smoothed and are dened as follows.  stays for I ,
F , C , U . Housing collateral ratio my is rescaled and measures collateral scarcity (myst =
mymax myt
mymax mymin ;myst 2 [0; 1]). The collateralmeasure is real estate wealth.The data is annual
from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Signicance at the10% level is denoted by
a *, and at the 5% level by **
(I ) (F ) (C ) (U )
= 0+1gdpt+2mystshapikt+3myst+4shapikt+5(t t)
 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0014
(-0.1239 ) (-0.3343 ) (-1.4332 ) (1.7016 )
0 0.5902** 0.1095** -0.1475 0.4478**
(12.4937 ) (2.6654 ) (-1.2167 ) (3.9414 )
1 -2.1758** 0.7118* 3.8192** -2.3552**
(-5.1324 ) (1.9297 ) (3.5107 ) (-2.3099 )
2 -3.9416** 0.1857 0.0837 3.6722*
(-4.9746 ) (0.2693 ) (0.0412 ) (1.9270 )
3 0.3225** -0.1752** 0.1696 -0.3168
(3.5707 ) (-2.2298 ) (0.7316 ) (-1.4586 )
4 0.3211 0.0779** 2.2129** -2.6118**
(0.8570 ) (0.2390 ) (2.3016 ) (-2.8985 )
5 0.0103** -0.0014 -0.0124** 0.0035
(6.8022 ) (-1.0508 ) (-3.1939 ) (0.9596 )
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Table 8: Risk Sharing and Asset Prices. Robustness check
Table reports results from the panel WLS/OLS regressions eck;t = U+Ugspk;t+Uk;t. gspk;t is the
growth rate of gross state product in state k in period t andgspk;tis gspk;t minus US-wide value of
gspUSt. ck;t and eck;t are dened similarly using state consumption. U is interpreted as amount
of uninsured risk and is dened as U = U0 + U1z, where z contains chosen aggregate variables
 are not reported. cayt is de-meaned consumption-wealth ratio. cayt is deviation from cointegra-
ting relationship between consumption, asset wealth and labor income. CumDt is dened as the
fraction of states in the sample, which have deregulated. The data are annual from 1963 to 1998.
T-statistics are in parentheses. Signicance at the10% level is denoted by a *, and at the 5% level by **
( I ) ( II ) ( III ) ( IV ) ( V ) ( VI ) ( VII ) ( VIII )
0 0.34** 0.30** 0.33** 0.32** 0.32** 0.1837 0.30 0.18*
(11.64) (11.68) (11.37) (10.77) (10.54) (6.34) (9.92) (6.13)
gdpt -3.16** -2.61** -2.47** -2.90** -4.18** -3.21** -4.27**
(-3.31) (-2.69) (-2.54) (-2.87) (-4.32) (-3.18) (-4.39)
cayt 9.54** 8.22** 15.66** 8.84** 10.02** 1.52 8.81**
(3.59) (3.10) (2.72) (3.32) (4.15) (0.48) (3.15)
gdptcayt -194.54
(-1.46)
gdptCumDt 3.67 10.77** 8.10** 12.16**
(1.21) (3.61) (2.54) (3.58)
caytCumDt 26.98** 5.65
(4.11) (0.86)
Method WLS WLS WLS WLS WLS OLS WLS OLS
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Table A1: Importance of small businesses across U.S. states
Low Middle High
Shapik SBEk Shapik SBEk Shapik SBEk
1 Maryland D.of Columbia New York Missouri California West Virginia
2 Rhode Island Nevada Alabama Georgia Colorado Iowa
3 Virginia Massachusetts Pennsylvania Wisconsin Oregon Nebraska
4 Michigan Connecticut Georgia Alabama Kentucky Kansas
5 New Jersey Delaware Utah Rhode Island Vermont Washington
6 West Virginia New York Illinois Virginia Mississippi Florida
7 Ohio Pennsylvania Wisconsin Mississippi Texas Oklahoma
8 Massachusetts Illinois Alaska Arkansas Wyoming Hawaii
9 Connecticut S. Carolina New Mexico Texas Oklahoma Vermont
10 S. Carolina N. Carolina North Carolina Kentucky Kansas Oregon
11 Hawaii California Louisiana Utah Arkansas Idaho
12 Delaware Ohio Missouri Maryland Montana Alaska
13 Nevada Tennessee D. of Columbia New Hampshire Idaho New Mexico
14 Florida Michigan Maine Maine Nebraska South Dakota
15 Indiana Indiana Washington Arizona Iowa North Dakota
16 Arizona New Jersey Tennessee Louisiana North Dakota Wyoming
17 New Hampshire Minnesota Minnesota Colorado South Dakota Montana
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